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Cut-off points for the rational believer 
 
(by Lina Maria Lissia, University of Turin) 
 
Abstract. I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a (probabilistic) Sorites, and argue that this should 
modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the cut-off point 
problem” and contend that this problem, well known by students of the Sorites, ought to play a key role in 
the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle.  
   Very briefly, I show that, in the Lottery Paradox, the premises “ticket n°1 will lose”, “ticket n°2 will 
lose”… “ticket n°1000 will lose” are logically equivalent to soritical premises of the form “buying 
n tickets does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ buying n + 1 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery” 
(where ⊃ is the material conditional). As a result, failing to believe, for some ticket, that it will lose 
comes down to introducing a cut-off point in a chain of soritical premises. I call the view that, for some 
ticket, we should not believe that it loses the “the cut-off point view”.  
   One important consequence of this reformulation of the Lottery Paradox is that the most popular 
solution to the puzzle, i.e. denying the Lockean Thesis, becomes less attractive. The reason is that keeping 
Belief Closure entails the (rather counterintuitive) cut-off point view. In order to make the 
counterintuitive character of this view emerge as clearly as possible I consider a heap variant of the 
original lottery scenario: in this scenario (which is generally used in the context of a different puzzle, viz. 
the Sorites) the worrying consequences of the cut-off point view become evident.  
   Finally, I demonstrate that denying Belief Closure is not enough. More precisely, it is not enough to 
solve a puzzle which is closely related to Kyburg’s and which puts us before the following dilemma: we 
should either accept the cut-off point view or reject classical-logic modus ponens. That is, not merely 
Belief Closure, but a fundamental principle of classical logic. 
 
1. The lottery scenario 
 
   In the literature on rational belief and rational degrees of belief it is usually claimed 
that the two following principles cannot be jointly satisfied:  
 
   Belief Closure. Rational belief is closed under classical logic. 
   Lockean Thesis. If and only if, given her evidence, p is very probable (where “very 
probable” means “equal to or higher than a specified threshold value t”), then the agent 
should believe p. 
 
   Indeed, joint acceptance of Belief Closure and the Lockean Thesis gives rise to the 
well-known Lottery Paradox, first proposed by Kyburg (1961).  
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   Consider a fair 1000-ticket lottery with exactly one winner. The probability, for each 
ticket, that it will win is very low, i.e. it is 0.001. It follows that if t = 0.999, then, by the 
Lockean Thesis, one should believe, of each ticket, that it will lose. By multiple 
applications of Belief Closure, one should also believe the conjunction “ticket n°1 will 
lose & ticket n°2 will lose . . . & ticket n°1000 will lose”. However, given that the 
lottery is fair and has exactly one winner, the negation of “ticket n°1 will lose &  ticket 
n°2 will lose . . . & ticket n°1000 will lose” has a probability of 1; therefore, by the 
Lockean Thesis, one should believe it. So one should believe both “ticket n°1 will lose 
& ticket n°2 will lose . . . & ticket n°1000 will lose” and its negation. As it is generally 
accepted that one should not believe two pairwise inconsistent sentences, we conclude 
that Belief Closure and the Lockean Thesis are incompatible.  
 
   As Leitgeb (2014) puts it, we can classify a huge part of the classical literature on 
rational belief according to which principle is dropped: for instance, Isaac Levi (1967) 
accepts Belief Closure but rejects the Lockean Thesis, while Henry Kyburg (1961) 
accepts the Lockean Thesis and rejects Belief Closure.  
   The most widespread solution to the puzzle, however, consists in denying the Lockean 
Thesis: among the authors who adopt this option are Lehrer (1975; 1990), Kaplan 
(1981a; 1981b; 1996), Stalnaker (1984), Pollock (1995), Ryan (1996), Evnine (1999), 
Nelkin (2000), Adler (2002), Douven (2002), Smith (2010; 2016; 2018), and Kelp 
(2017).  
   Philosophers who believe, instead, that the Lottery Paradox puts pressure on Belief 
Closure include Klein (1985), Foley (1992), Hawthorne and Bovens (1999), Kyburg 
and Teng (2001), Christensen (2004), Hawthorne and Makinson (2007), Kolodny 
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(2007), Easwaran and Fitelson (2015). 
   One notable exception to this categorization (deniers of the Lockean Thesis vs. deniers 
of Belief Closure) is Leitgeb’s view. Indeed, Leitgeb (2014; 2015) defends a form of 
contextualism which, he contends, allows us to keep both the Lockean Thesis and Belief 
Closure. I will come back to his proposal in the last section of the paper.  
 
   In this paper, I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a (probabilistic) Sorites, and 
argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I 
focus on what I will call “the cut-off point problem” and contend that this problem, well 
known by students of the Sorites, ought to play a central role in the debate on Kyburg’s 
puzzle.  
   Very briefly, I will show that, in the Lottery Paradox, the premises “ticket n°1 will 
lose”, “ticket n°2 will lose”…“ticket n°1000 will lose” are logically equivalent to 
soritical premises of the form “buying n tickets does not allow me to win the 
lottery ⊃ buying n + 1 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery” (where ⊃ is the 
material conditional). As a result, failing to believe, for some ticket, that it will lose 
comes down to introducing a cut-off point in a chain of soritical premises. I call the 
view that, for some ticket, we should not believe that it loses the “the cut-off point 
view”.  
   One important consequence of this reformulation of the Lottery Paradox is that the 
most popular solution to the puzzle, i.e. denying the Lockean Thesis, becomes less 
attractive. The reason for this is that keeping Belief Closure entails the (rather 
counterintuitive) cut-off point view. In order to make the counterintuitive character of 
this view emerge as clearly as possible I will consider a heap variant of the original 
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lottery scenario: in this scenario (which is generally used in the context of a different 
puzzle, viz. the Sorites) the worrying consequences of the cut-off point view become 
evident.  
   Finally, I demonstrate that denying Belief Closure is not enough. More precisely, it is 
not enough to solve a puzzle which is closely related to Kyburg’s and which puts us 
before the following dilemma: we should either accept the cut-off point view1 or reject 
classical-logic modus ponens. That is, not merely Belief Closure, but a fundamental 
principle of classical logic. 
 
   The next section will be devoted to reformulating Kyburg’s original puzzle so that its 
connection with the Sorites becomes obvious. However, before that, one more 
preliminary remark is needed. In presenting the Lottery Paradox, I used the expression 
Belief Closure. I could have been more specific, though: in Kyburg’s puzzle a specific 
principle is applied, i.e. the closure of rational belief under conjunction introduction. 
From now on, I will call such a principle “conjunction introduction*”, in order to 
distinguish this epistemic version of the conjunction introduction schema from its non-
epistemic, classical-logic counterpart. I will do the same for the other logical principles: 
e.g. when referring to the closure of rational belief under classical-logic modus ponens 
and modus tollens, I will use the labels “modus ponens*” and “modus tollens*” 
respectively.  
                                                
1As it will become clear in what follows, in this further puzzle the expression “cut-off point” refers to 
something a bit different from what it denotes in Kyburg’s original puzzle. Specifically, in this additional 
puzzle we have a cut-off point if and only if one in a series of soritical conditionals of the form “I should 
believe that buying n tickets does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ I should believe that buying n + 1 
tickets does not allow me to win the lottery” is false. 
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2. The Wide Scope Paradox  
 
   Consider again our fair 1000-ticket lottery, with t = 0.999. Also assume that tickets 
are numbered from 1 to 1000. By the Lockean Thesis, in this scenario one should 
believe, for instance, “ticket n°1 wins ∨ ticket n°2 wins…∨ ticket n°999 wins”, as its 
probability is 0.999. That is, one should believe that the set which includes tickets from 
n°1 to n°999 contains the winning ticket. At the same time, one should not believe 
“ticket n°1 wins ∨ ticket n°2 wins…∨ ticket n°998 wins”, as this sentence only has a 
probability of 0.998. That is, we should suspend our judgement on whether the winning 
ticket is to be found between ticket n°1 and ticket n°998 (included). 
   From now on, instead of saying that one should (or should not) believe the sentence 
“ticket n°1 wins ∨ ticket n°2 wins… ∨  ticket n°n wins” I will say that one should (or 
should not) believe “buying n tickets allows me to win the lottery”. That is, I will 
assume that the probability of “buying n tickets allows me to win the lottery” equals the 
probability of “ticket n°1 wins ∨ ticket n°2 wins…∨ ticket n°n wins”. Of course, as a 
matter of fact someone who buys 999 tickets could buy the tickets from n°2 to n°1000 
and not those from n°1 to n°999. This simplification will not affect my point, though, 
and it will make my presentation smoother2.  
   Let me now introduce another logical equivalence that will be of much help in what 
follows. “Ticket n°1 will lose” (that is, given the above, “buying 1 ticket does not allow 
                                                
2Instead of “buying n tickets allows me to win the lottery” I could have used a different formulation, i.e. 
for instance, “someone who buys n tickets wins the lottery”. The only reason why in what follows I will 
not adopt this alternative formulation (or a still different one) is that the use, in the former, of the first 
person makes things easier to formulate.  
 6 
me to win”) is just equivalent to a negated conjunction, i.e. to the negation of 
“buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win & buying 1 ticket allows me to win”. That 
is, “ticket n°1 will lose” (or “buying 1 ticket does not allow me to win”) is equivalent to 
“buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win ⊃ buying 1 ticket does not allow me to win”. 
More generally, it can be noted that “ticket n°n+1 will lose” = “~(buying n tickets does 
not allow me to win & buying n + 1 tickets allows me to win)” = “buying n tickets does 
not allow me to win ⊃ buying n + 1 tickets does not allow me to win” = “~(the winning 
ticket is not among the tickets from 1 to n included & it is among the tickets from 1 to n 
+ 1 included)”, where ~ is the negation symbol. 
 
   What is the point of introducing these equivalences? First, these equivalences can be 
used to show that starting from a lottery scenario we can generate a (probabilistic) 
Sorites. I will call this argument “Wide Scope Paradox” (WSP), in order to distinguish 
it from a related argument that I will label “Narrow Scope Paradox”, and that I present 
in section 5. I have called it “WSP” because in it the rational belief operator has wide 
scope over the conditional premises; in the Narrow Scope Paradox instead, as we will 
see, the belief operator has narrow scope over the antecedent and the consequent of the 
same conditionals.  
 
   Consider the following sentences. Remember that we have set t = 0.999. 
  
   (1) Buying 1000 tickets allows me to win the lottery. 
   (2) Buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery. 
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   Also consider 1000 sentences of the form: 
  
   Buying n tickets does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ buying n + 1 tickets does not 
allow me to win the lottery. 
 
   For convenience, I will call the above conditionals “P-conditionals”. The paradox 
consists in the fact that by multiple applications of modus ponens* we conclude (3), 
which contradicts (1): 
  
   (3) Buying 1000 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery. (!) 
 
   Note that we are bound to believe all the premises. Indeed, (1) and (2) both have a 
probability of 1, and each of the P-conditionals has a probability of 0.999. Why 0.999? 
Consider, for instance, the conditional “buying 499 tickets does not allow me to win 
⊃ buying 500 tickets does not allow me to win”: it is equivalent to “buying 499 tickets 
allows me to win ∨ buying 500 tickets does not allow me to win”. The reason why this 
disjunction has a probability of 0.999 is that its probability is calculated by adding the 
probability of “buying 499 tickets allows me to win”, i.e. 0.499, to the probability of 
“buying 500 tickets does not allow me to win”, i.e. 0.5; the probabilities must be added 
here because the sentences we are dealing with are mutually inconsistent. Another way 
of reaching the same result is by focusing on what would make the P-conditionals false: 
in order to falsify one of them, it is both necessary and sufficient that the winning ticket 
is exactly ticket n°n+1, which has a probability of 0.001.  
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   So one should believe (1), (2) and each of the conditional premises; nonetheless, one 
should not believe (3), which has a probability of 0, whence the problematic outcome: 
by modus ponens*, we should believe two pairwise inconsistent sentences, i.e. (1) and 
its negation. 
 
   Now, it is not simply the case that we can generate a (probabilistic) Sorites starting 
from the lottery scenario. Actually, the premises of the original puzzle by Kyburg and 
those of WSP are equivalent. 
   Recall the logical equivalences I have introduced. It can be noted that (1) is equivalent 
to the sentence that, in the original version of the puzzle, says that the 1000-ticket 
lottery is fair and has one winner (i.e. to the disjunction “ticket n°1 wins ∨ ticket n°2 
wins…∨ ticket n°1000 wins”). (2) corresponds, instead, to a premise which is left 
implicit in the original argument, i.e. to a premise which is trivially true in the scenario 
and which says that the lottery is not a 0-ticket lottery which has a winner. Finally, 
“buying n tickets does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ buying n + 1 tickets does not 
allow me to win the lottery” is equivalent to “ticket n°n+1 will lose”; that is, the P-
conditionals are equivalent to the premises of Kyburg’s original argument that say that 
ticket n°1 will lose, ticket n°2 will lose, etc.   
 
   So WSP is just a reformulation of the standard Lottery Paradox3. However, one clear 
difference between Kyburg’s original argument and WSP is that in the original 
                                                
3This strengthens a point by Dorothy Edgington (1992; 1997). Indeed, Edgington claims that the Lottery 
Paradox and the Sorites are structurally similar, so that a common strategy should be applied to solve 
both. However, unlike mine, her view presupposes the acceptance of a degree-theoretic framework (i.e. 
the idea that there are such things as degrees of truth). Moreover, and most importantly, my claim is 
 9 
argument conjunction introduction* is used, whereas in WSP modus ponens* is applied. 
Now, it turns out that it is possible to reformulate WSP so that conjunction 
introduction* is used. 
 
   Consider the conjunction “buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win & buying 1000 
tickets allows me to win”; call it (C). It is equivalent to (D): 
  
   (D): (buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win & buying 1 ticket allows me to win) ∨ 
(buying 1 ticket does not allow me to win & buying 2 tickets allows me to 
win)… ∨ (buying 999 tickets does not allow me to win & buying 1000 tickets allows 
me to win). 
 
   As we have seen, given t = 0.999, one should believe both (1) and (2). So by 
conjunction introduction* one should believe (C); but then one should believe (D). 
However, each disjunct of (D) only has a probability of 0.001, so one should believe its 
negation. Now, by applying conjunction introduction* to ~(buying 0 tickets does not 
allow me to win & buying 1 ticket allows me to win), ~(buying 1 ticket does not allow 
me to win & buying 2 tickets allows me to win)… ~(buying 999 tickets does not allow 
me to win & buying 1000 tickets allows me to win), one should believe the negation of 
(D). That is, by conjunction introduction*, one should believe both a sentence and its 
negation, exactly as in Kyburg’s original version of the puzzle.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
stronger than Edgington’s: the Lottery Paradox is not merely similar to the Sorites Paradox; the Lottery 
Paradox just is a (probabilistic) Sorites. 
 10 
   It could be asked what is the point of introducing this reformulation of the Lottery 
Paradox, i.e. of introducing WSP. Actually, I think that WSP is interesting in itself, as it 
shows that the Lottery Paradox just is a (probabilistic) Sorites. However, this is not all 
there is to WSP. The main reasons why in what follows I will use WSP instead of the 
original formulation of the Paradox are matters of clarity for my current purposes. 
Indeed, using WSP makes it more natural to rerun the Lottery Paradox starting from a 
heap scenario; as a result, the advantages of switching to a heap scenario are more 
apparent and the main point of the paper will emerge more clearly.  
 
3. Setting the threshold at 1 
 
   If we reject the Lockean Thesis the Lottery Paradox is blocked. However, it is 
traditionally assumed that accepting t = 1 allows us to keep both the Lockean Thesis and 
Belief Closure (among the authors who argue that we should accept t = 1 are van 
Fraassen (1995), Arló-Costa (2001), Arló-Costa and Parikh (2005)). One main 
consequence of this solution is that we are forced to accept the cut-off point view, i.e. as 
specified above, we are bound to disbelieve4, for some ticket, that it will lose (in the 
original scenario, for each ticket, we are bound to disbelieve that it will lose). In order 
to better evaluate the consequences of this view, let us put aside for a moment the 
standard lottery scenario and use instead a classical example from the literature on 
vagueness, i.e. the heap example.  
   Note that replacing the lottery scenario with a different scenario (and more 
specifically, a heap scenario) is a perfectly legitimate move. Indeed, the Lottery Paradox 
                                                
4Throughout this paper, by “disbelieving p” I mean “not believing p”, which includes suspending one’s 
judgement on p and believing the negation of p.  
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is not a puzzle about lotteries. On the contrary, the point of the Paradox is a general one, 
and consists in showing that the Lockean Thesis (with t short of 1) and Belief Closure 
are incompatible. Moreover, we are perfectly allowed to assign probabilities to the 
premises of the Sorites, based on our evidence5.  
 
   For reminder, here is the classical, textbook version of the Sorites Paradox. 
 
   Consider (1’) and (2’). 
 
   (1’) 1000 grains are a heap6. 
   (2’) 0 grains are not a heap. 
  
   Also consider 1000 sentences of the form: 
  
                                                
5Clearly, this way of looking at the Lottery Paradox is at odds with those accounts of the latter which 
argue that we should deny the Lockean Thesis because evidence which is “merely probabilistic” is not 
enough for rational belief (see, for instance, Nelkin 2000, or Smith 2010, 2016 and 2018). These accounts 
usually focus on the original version of the Paradox or, when they consider variants of it, they focus on 
cases in which the relevant evidence is statistical.  
   However, it can be noted that the formulation I have given of the Lockean Thesis leaves it open whether 
the kind of evidence the agent relies on is “merely probabilistic” or not. That is, in my formulation of the 
Lockean Thesis, which I take to be standard, evidence need not be “merely probabilistic”. A consequence 
of this fact is that, as I say in the body of the paper, we should regard the original version of the Lottery 
Paradox as simply illustrating the conflict between the Lockean Thesis and Belief Closure. This is an 
important point, as it seems clear that the conflict does not vanish if we consider evidence which is not 
“merely probabilistic”. In other terms, reducing the Lottery Paradox to a problem concerning statistical 
evidence alone does not do justice to the challenge it illustrates, which is much more general.  
6Here “1000” could be replaced with any sufficiently high number. This of course holds for the Lottery 
Paradox too: instead of a 1000-ticket lottery we could consider a 5000-ticket lottery, or a 1 million-ticket 
lottery, etc. 
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   n grains are not a heap ⊃ n + 1 grains are not a heap  
 
   Let us call these sentences “P’-conditionals”. (1’), (2’) and the P’-conditionals seem 
true. However, multiple applications of classical-logic modus ponens let us infer the 
following puzzling conclusion: 
  
   (3’) 1000 grains are not a heap. (!) 
 
   I would like to stress that (1’)-(3’) is about truth, not rational belief: as students of the 
Sorites classically put it, the argument’s premises are intuitively true whereas the 
conclusion is intuitively false. However, it is easy to transform “the classical Sorites” 
into a version of WSP: as it will become clear below, one only needs to assign 
probabilities to the premises of (1’)-(3’), set an appropriate threshold for belief, and 
apply modus ponens* instead of modus ponens.  
   So how should we assign probabilities to the Sorites’ premises? Keep in mind that we 
are concerned here with the probabilities a rational agent assigns to sentences based on 
the relevant evidence. Now, given that we know both that 1000 grains are a heap and 
that 0 grains are not a heap, it seems that we should assign a probability of 1 to (1’) and 
(2’) respectively. What about the P’-conditionals? Clearly, we cannot assign to all of 
them a probability of 1. The reason is simple: consider the conjunction “0 grains are not 
a heap & 1000 grains are a heap”, which I will call (C’). It is equivalent to (D’): 
 
   (D’) (0 grains are not a heap & 1 grain is a heap) ∨ (1 grain is not a heap & 2 grains 
are a heap)… ∨ (999 grains are not a heap & 1000 grains are a heap).  
 13 
 
   Given that she knows that (C’), a rational agent should assign to (C’) a probability of 
1. But then she should also assign a probability of 1 to (D’); i.e. the sum of the 
probabilities of the disjuncts of (D’) must be 1. Therefore, it cannot be the case that all 
the P’-conditionals (which are just the negations of the disjuncts of (D’)) have a 
probability of 1. That is, it cannot be the case that all the disjuncts of (D’) have a 
probability of 0. Still, each of them can be assigned a very low probability. If we do so 
(i.e. if we assign each of them a very low probability), WSP can be formulated starting 
from a heap scenario. I will call this alternative formulation “Soritical Wide Scope 
Paradox” (SWSP). It goes as follows: assume that t is very high, but short of 1. By the 
Lockean Thesis, we should believe (1’), (2’), and each of the P’-conditionals. However, 
again by the Lockean Thesis, we should not believe (3’), which has a probability of 0; in 
fact, we should believe its negation, which is just (1’). That is, we end up having to 
believe both (1’) and its negation. (Exactly as for WSP, we can provide a version of 
SWSP in which conjunction introduction* is used, instead of modus ponens*. Indeed, 
we should believe (D’) (which has a probability of 1), but if its disjuncts are assigned 
very low probabilities, we should believe the negation of each of them, so that, by 
conjunction introduction*, we should believe the negation of (D’). That is, we should 
believe both (D’) and its negation7.) 
   One more precision is in order. We are supposing that the disjuncts of (D’) are all 
assigned low probabilities. That is, the probability distribution we are considering is a 
                                                
7For the sake of completeness, note that, both in the case of SWSP and of WSP, modus tollens* could 
also be used to generate the unacceptable conclusion. Indeed, as we have seen, by the Lockean Thesis we 
should believe (1’) ((1) in WSP) and all the conditional premises. However, by multiple applications of 
modus tollens*, we should believe the negation of (2’) (the negation of (2) in WSP), which has a 
probability of 0. 
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“uniform” one (one in which all the disjuncts have the same probability), or at least one 
in which all the disjuncts have a probability greater than 0. However, for the paradox to 
arise, we are not at all obliged to assign our probabilities this way. On the contrary, we 
can assume a probability distribution in which some disjuncts have a probability of 0 (in 
fact, as many as we wish, provided that the probabilities of the disjuncts in D’ sum up to 
1).  
   Here we come to a crucial point. Consider again SWSP. Exactly as WSP, we could 
block it either by dropping the Lockean Thesis or by dropping Belief Closure. However, 
as announced in the title of this section, we could be willing to keep both principles by 
setting t = 1. However, if we assume that t = 1 we are forced to conclude that, for at 
least one n, it is not the case that one should believe “n grains are not a heap ⊃ n + 1 
grains are not a heap”. Indeed, for at least one n, the probability of “n grains are not a 
heap & n + 1 grains are a heap” must be greater than 0 (otherwise the probability of (C’) 
would be 0, whereas, by hypothesis, it is 1). (Of course, if there is only one n such that 
the probability of “n grains are not a heap & n + 1 grains are a heap” is greater than 0, 
then, given that the probability of (C’) has to be 1, the probability of that disjunct must 
be 1.) 
   Clearly, if our evidence is distributed uniformly over the disjuncts of D’ we should 
neither believe the conditional “0 grains are not a heap ⊃ 1 grain is not a heap”, nor any 
of the other P’-conditionals. Conversely, if we have absolutely no evidence for some of 
the disjuncts (i.e. if we assign a zero probability to, say, the first twenty disjuncts), the 
cut-off point will come “later” in the distribution (e.g. we should believe “19 grains are 
not a heap ⊃ 20 grains are not a heap”, but we should not believe “20 grains are not a 
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heap ⊃ 21 grains are not a heap”). Anyway, what matters is that in both cases we are 
forced to disbelieve at least one of P’-conditionals.  
 
   So we have seen that the cut-off point view follows from the acceptance of t = 1. 
Now, it seems clear that in order to solve WSP one must also solve SWSP, which is a 
simple variant of WSP, in which a heap scenario is used instead of a lottery one.  
   Many authors already reject the cut-off point view for the original lottery scenario; 
notably, all those who defend the Lockean Thesis with t short of 1. Switching to a heap 
scenario raises an interesting problem for those who accept the Lockean Thesis with t = 
1, as perhaps some of them will find the outcome that we should disbelieve at least one 
of the P’-conditionals unpalatable. Of course, “some” does not mean “all of them”. Still, 
the fact that if we set t = 1 we must accept the cut-off point view with respect to SWSP 
is something we should keep in mind when evaluating a solution to the Lottery Paradox, 
and this was the point I wanted to make in this section. 
 
4. Rejecting the Lockean Thesis altogether  
 
   As we know, a possible way of solving WSP consists in accepting the Lockean Thesis 
with t short of 1 and rejecting Belief Closure. Another possible way out of the puzzle is 
keeping both the Lockean Thesis and Belief Closure, while setting t at 1. However, we 
have seen that the latter option forces us to adopt the cut-off point view with respect to 
(S)WSP.  
   Let us now turn to the third and last option, which consists in rejecting the Lockean 
Thesis across the board and accepting, instead, a different norm of belief. The 
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alternative norms I will consider are the most popular competitors of the Lockean 
Thesis, i.e. the truth norm and the knowledge norm of belief. In this section, I show that 
accepting either of these alternative norms still forces us to endorse the cut-off point 
view with respect to (S)WSP. 
 
   The truth norm may be defined as the norm according to which we should believe p if 
and only if p is true. During its history, the truth norm has been precisified in various 
ways; however, the subtleties of the different definitions are not relevant here8. As far as 
WSP is concerned, this norm provides a clear verdict: the argument has one false 
premise. Indeed, there is a ticket (the winning one) of which we should not believe that 
it will lose. That is, one of the P-conditionals is false. 
   Regarding the knowledge norm, i.e. the norm according to which we should believe 
that p if and only if we know that p9, it also provides a straightforward solution to WSP: 
we should believe both (1) and (2), as we know that if we buy all the tickets we will 
win, and that if we do not buy any ticket we will lose. However, we should disbelieve 
all the P-conditionals. This is because we do not know, of each ticket, that it will lose.  
 
   Now consider SWSP. If we accept the truth norm, there are only two ways out of the 
puzzle: one consists in embracing the cut-off point view, the other in denying Belief 
                                                
8Among others, Wedgwood 2002, Boghossian 2003, Shah 2003, Gibbard 2005, Bykvist and Hattiangadi 
2007, Engel 2007, and Thomson 2008 contain stimulating remarks on the way the truth norm should be 
made precise. 
9The knowledge norm is adopted by a growing number of epistemologists; its most famous defender is 
Timothy Williamson (see Williamson 2000). Note, though, that in Williamson’s work the defence of such 
a norm is only implicit and must be derived from the author’s defence of the knowledge norm of 
assertion.  
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Closure10. The problem that faces the truth norm’s advocate is the following: is there 
one grain such that when added to a collection of grains which is not a heap turns it into 
a heap? If the answer is yes, then, by the truth norm, there is one n such that we should 
not believe the conditional “n grains are not a heap ⊃ n + 1 grains are not a heap”. If, 
instead, she believes that there is not such a n, she must reject Belief Closure. 
    Similar remarks hold for the knowledge norm’s defender, even though the problem 
she faces is slightly different: is there one n such that we know that n grains are not a 
heap but we do not know that n + 1 grains are not a heap? Depending on her answer, the 
knowledge norm’s advocate will be either endorsing the cut-off point view or denying 
Belief Closure.  
   However, we have seen that SWSP is an innocent variant of WSP, and that, as a 
result, we should give a unified answer to the two puzzles. This means that, given that 
both the truth norm’s and the knowledge norm’s advocates endorse the cut-off point 
view with respect to WSP, they should also endorse it with respect to SWSP. In other 
words, if we accept either the truth norm or the knowledge norm of belief, we are bound 
to accept the cut-off point conclusion with respect to SWSP. 
 
   Of course, rejecting the Lockean Thesis does not automatically entail that we should 
endorse either the truth norm or the knowledge norm. Indeed, among the most classical 
proposals concerning the Lottery Paradox is that of amending the Lockean Thesis by 
adding a defeat clause (Pollock 1995 is a good example of this kind of approach). Other 
                                                
10Of course, the truth norm’s advocate may also solve SWSP by claiming that (2’) is false or that (3’) is 
true. The claim according to which (3’) is true has been defended in the literature on the Sorites by Peter 
Unger (1979). However, I will not deal with these very unpopular options here. (And anyway, as it will 
become clear below, these options are not relevant for my argument’s purposes). 
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(more recent) accounts do not simply add to the Lockean Thesis a defeat condition, but 
propose an outright modification of the threshold constraint (see Lin and Kelly 2012a 
and 2012b. According to some criteria, Leitgeb’s account (2014; 2015) can also be 
regarded as part of this category (see Staffel forthcoming)). However, these proposals 
also entail the cut-off point view. So, if I am right in claiming that the solution to WSP 
should be extended to SWSP, the advocates of these accounts should also endorse the 
cut-off point view with respect to SWSP11. More generally, given that disbelieving (1) 
or (2) does not seem to be an option, it appears that if we want to preserve Belief 
Closure we are forced to disbelieve at least one of the P-conditionals.  
 
   Let us take stock: we can keep Belief Closure only if we accept the cut-off point view 
as far as SWSP is concerned. Indeed, in order to provide a unified solution to WSP and 
SWSP we only have three options: 
 
   (i) accepting the Lockean Thesis with t short of 1, which implies rejecting Belief 
Closure. 
   (ii) accepting the Lockean Thesis with t = 1, which allows us to keep Belief Closure, 
but forces us to accept the cut-off point view.  
   (iii) rejecting the Lockean Thesis across the board, which also allows us to keep Belief 
Closure, but forces us to endorse the cut-off point view.  
 
                                                
11Another option consists in denying the Lockean Thesis while adopting, at the same time, an 
eliminativist approach to the notion of full rational belief. That is, it consists in rejecting the whole 
framework in which the Lottery Paradox is formulated. According to this very radical approach, which I 
will put aside here, talk about full belief should be entirely replaced by talk about degrees of belief. For a 
discussion of this option see Foley 1992. 
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5. The Narrow Scope Paradox 
 
   In this last section I will show that, despite the appearances, option (i), i.e. accepting 
the Lockean Thesis with t short of 1, does not allow us to avoid the cut-off point 
conclusion (at least with respect to the argument I am going to present).  
 
   Consider (4) and (5).  
  
   (4) I should believe that buying 1000 tickets allows me to win the lottery. 
   (5) I should believe that buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery.  
 
   Also consider 1000 conditionals of the form “I should believe that buying n tickets 
does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ I should believe that buying n + 1 tickets does 
not allow me to win the lottery”. 
 
   Repeated applications of classical-logic modus ponens lead to (6):  
 
   (6) I should believe that buying 1000 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery. (!) 
 
   I will call this puzzle “Narrow Scope Paradox” (NSP). As explained above, the reason 
for this label is that in NSP the rational belief operator has narrow scope over the 
antecedent and the consequent of the P-conditionals (whereas in WSP it has wide scope 
over them). 
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   Now, suppose that we adopt option (i), i.e. that we accept the Lockean Thesis with t 
short of 1: option (i) clearly implies that one of the conditionals in (4)-(6) is false. That 
is, here too, we have a cut-off point, even though of a different kind than in (S)WSP: 
what I mean by a cut-off point here is just that one of the conditionals of the form “I 
should believe that buying n tickets does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ I should 
believe that buying n + 1 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery” is false (see 
footnote 1). For convenience, and in spite of the differences with (S)WSP, I will extend 
the use of the expression “cut-off point view” to the view that one of the conditionals in 
NSP is false. 
   Where the cut-off point falls of course depends on the value of t. If we assume, as 
above, that t = 0.999 and that the 1000-ticket lottery is fair, then the false premise will 
be “I should believe that buying 1 ticket does not allow me to win the lottery ⊃ I should 
believe that buying 2 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery”. Indeed, by the 
Lockean Thesis, one should believe that buying 1 ticket does not allow her to win. 
However, one should not believe that buying 2 tickets does not allow her to win 
(“buying 2 tickets does not allow me to win” has a probability of 0.998). In other words, 
even if the defender of (i) manages to avoid the cut-off point conclusion in the case of 
WSP, she cannot avoid it in the case of NSP.  
    This remark can be extended to a heap variant of NSP. As it was already the case 
with WSP, we can generate NSP starting from a heap scenario instead of a lottery one, 
i.e. we can generate a Soritical Narrow Scope Paradox (SNSP). One just has to replace 
(4) with “I should believe that 1000 grains are a heap”, (5) with “I should believe that 0 
grains are not a heap” and the conditionals in (4)-(6) with sentences of the form “I 
should believe that n grains are not a heap ⊃ I should believe that n + 1 grains are not a 
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heap”. Finally, (6) must be replaced with “I should believe that 1000 grains are not a 
heap”. 
   Here too (i.e. in the case of SNSP too) the advocate of (i) will be obliged to say that 
there is a cut-off point. Where this cut-off point is will again depend on the value of t 
and on the specific probability distribution associated with her evidence. 
 
   As announced in section 1, the above has some interesting consequences concerning 
Leitgeb’s account of the Lottery Paradox. According to Leitgeb (2014; 2015), the 
context in which we ask ourselves whether a given ticket n wins and that in which we 
focus on the fact that some ticket will win (i.e. that the lottery is fair and has one 
winner) are different and allow us to set different thresholds for rational belief. 
   More specifically, in a context in which we focus on the fact that some ticket will win, 
Leitgeb’s theory of belief constrains us to set t = 1 (and therefore to suspend our 
judgement on each of the tickets). Instead, a context in which we concentrate on 
whether a given ticket n will win is one in which we can set t = 0.999, and this will not 
cause the Lottery Paradox to arise, provided that we “partition” (i.e. that we subdivide) 
the probabilities in our distribution as imposed by the theory. According to Leitgeb, the 
Lottery Paradox results from fallaciously mixing premises that come from these 
different contexts.  
   However, imagine that instead of talking about tickets we were talking about grains: 
in the context in which t = 1 we would have to accept the cut-off point conclusion with 
respect to SWSP. In the context in which, instead, we ask ourselves whether some 
specific ticket will win (whether some specific grain turns something that is not a heap 
into a heap) and we are assuming t = 0.999, we would have to say that one of the 
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conditionals in SNSP is false. 
 
   It is noteworthy that in (S)NSP the principle that is applied is not Belief Closure, but 
classical-logic modus ponens. Indeed, this is an important fact: until I only considered 
(S)WSP, the dilemma was between accepting the Lockean Thesis with t short of 1 on 
the one hand and accepting both Belief Closure and the cut-off point view on the other 
hand. Thanks to (S)NSP we are now aware that rejecting Belief Closure is not enough to 
avoid the cut-off point view (at least not with respect to this further puzzle): rejecting 
classical-logic modus ponens12 is necessary. That is, not merely Belief Closure, but a 
fundamental principle of classical logic. The reason is that dropping Belief Closure 
would allow us to block (S)WSP, but not (S)NSP. Instead, giving up classical-logic 
modus ponens would solve both (S)WSP and (S)NSP: if classical-logic modus ponens 
is invalid, Belief Closure fails; however, the opposite direction of the conditional does 
                                                
12Or rather, classical-logical modus ponens plus at least two other principles, i.e. classical-logic 
conjunction introduction and classical-logic modus tollens. Indeed, NSP can be generated by using 
indifferently modus ponens, conjunction introduction and modus tollens. I have explicitly formulated the 
modus ponens version, but the versions in which conjunction introduction and modus tollens are used are 
easy to work out. To provide a formulation of NSP in which conjunction introduction is used it suffices to 
notice that “I should believe that buying 1000 tickets allows me to win the lottery & I should believe that 
buying 0 tickets does not allow me to win the lottery” is equivalent to “(I should believe that buying 0 
tickets does not allow me to win & I should believe that buying 1 ticket allows me to win) ∨ (I should 
believe that buying 1 ticket does not allow me to win & I should believe that buying 2 tickets allows me 
to win)… ∨ (I should believe that buying 999 tickets does not allow me to win & I should believe that 
buying 1000 tickets allows me to win)”. If we regard all its disjuncts as false, then, by conjunction 
introduction, this last disjunction is both true and false (provided, of course, that we assume that “I should 
believe that buying 1000 tickets allows me to win the lottery & I should believe that buying 0 tickets does 
not allow me to win the lottery” is true). 
   Concerning the modus tollens version, the contradiction is generated by assuming both (4) and all the 
conditionals in (4)-(6), and by applying modus tollens as many times as needed.  
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not hold. In other words, if we want to solve (S)NSP, we should either endorse the cut-
off point view or give up classical-logic modus ponens. 
   I will not take a stand here on which of these two very radical alternatives is the best. 
Of course, this new dilemma could be regarded as favouring the cut-off point view, i.e. 
as a clear indication of the fact that, puzzling as they may be, cut-off points are 
unavoidable. However, the validity of classical-logic modus ponens has been 
challenged in the past. Dialetheists, for instance, argue that the derivation of q from p ⊃	  
q and p can fail, although in very special circumstances, when both p and ~p are true 
(see, most notably, Priest 1979 and Beall 2009). For their part, relevant logicians have 
questioned the validity of disjunctive syllogism (which is just modus ponens for the 
material conditional modulo double negation principles; see Anderson and Belnap 
1975)13.  
   Anyway, I will not tackle this issue here. In this paper I wanted to show that keeping 
Belief Closure becomes a less appealing option when one sees what happens if instead 
of a lottery scenario a different material is used, notably, a heap scenario. However, it is 
also worth noting that rejecting Belief Closure is not enough: as we have just seen, if we 
want to avoid the cut-off point conclusion with respect to (S)NSP we should embrace an 
even more radical solution, i.e. denying classical-logic modus ponens. 
 
   The above also teaches us something important concerning the most popular norms of 
belief on the market. Indeed, it can be noted that they all entail the cut-off point view 
(either only with respect to (S)NSP or with respect to both (S)WSP and (S)NSP): 
                                                
13I should also mention here the advocates of the so-called “degree-theoretic view of vagueness”; indeed, 
many “degree-theorists” reject modus ponens when degrees of truth are involved in the inference. 
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whether we assume the Lockean Thesis (with t = 1 or with t short of 1), the truth norm 
or the knowledge norm, we end up with a cut-off point “somewhere”. More precisely, if 
we assume the Lockean Thesis with t short of 1, we end up with a cut-off point (only) in 
(S)NSP. If, instead, we assume either the Lockean Thesis with t = 1, the truth norm or 
the knowledge norm, we end up with a cut-off point both in (S)WSP and in (S)NSP. 
Indeed, accepting any of these three norms makes it the case that for some ticket we 
should not believe that it loses/that for some grain we should not believe that adding it 
to something which is not a heap does not turn it into a heap. So some conditional in 
(S)WSP is unacceptable. But it is also the case that (S)NSP has one false conditional: 
for some n, we should believe “buying n tickets does not allow me to win” (“n grains 
are not a heap”), while we should not believe “buying n + 1 tickets does not allow me to 
win” (“n + 1 grains are not a heap”). 
   Consequently, if we want to avoid cut-off points altogether, it is not enough to give up 
classical-logic modus ponens: denial of modus ponens would block both (S)WSP and 
(S)NSP, but were we to keep any of these three norms of belief, the cut-off points 
would still be there. As a result, if we want to avoid cut-off points, we should reject all 
three norms; i.e. we should deny modus ponens (to block the paradoxes) and we should 
go through a quite radical rethinking of the way we conceive norms of belief. 
   Of course, this result too could be regarded as favouring the cut-off point view, i.e. as 
proof of the fact that cut-off points cannot be avoided. On the contrary, I think that the 
cut-off points’ opponents could take up the challenge. Notably, it seems to me that the 
challenge can be broken into three “smaller” ones: the cut-off points’ enemies should (i) 
propose a suitable non-classical framework in which (S)NSP can be dealt with; (ii) 
come up with weaker (but still sensible) coherence constraints on rational belief 
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(weaker than Belief Closure)14; iii) propose a norm of belief which can be naturally 
associated with such constraints, and which does not entail cut-off points. These 
certainly are hard challenges, but hard is not impossible. 
   More generally, I believe that it is premature for both sides (the cut-off points’ 
advocates and their opponents) to claim success: more work has to be done in order to 
understand the structure of (S)WSP and (S)NSP, as well as their mutual relations. 
Hopefully, from such work decisive arguments will result against or in favour of cut-off 
points. For the time being, I take it to be the main lesson of this paper that the “cut-off 
point problem” (i.e. the question whether our solution to the Lottery Paradox and its 
variants should allow for cut-off points) ought to play a key role in the debate on the 
Lottery Paradox. In the literature on the Sorites, this question has always been central. 
The present article is a plea for writers on rational belief and rational degrees of belief 
to focus on this issue, which has been neglected so far. 
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